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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews arguments and evidence on the impact of globalization on the environment, then
presents evidence on production and international trade flows in five heavily polluting industries for
52 countries over the period 1981-98.  A new decomposition of revealed comparative advantage
(RCA) according to geographical origin reveals a delocalization to the South for all heavily polluting
industries except non-ferrous metals that exhibits South-North delocalization in accordance with
factor-abundance driven response to a reduction in trade barriers. Panel estimation of a gravity
model of bilateral trade on the same data set reveals that, on average, polluting industries have
higher barriers-to-trade costs (except non-ferrous metals with significantly lower barriers to trade)
and little evidence of delocalization in response to a North-South regulatory gap. 
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1 Introduction
In the debate on globalization and the environment, there is
concern that the erasing of national borders through reduced
barriers to trade will lead to competition for investment and
jobs, resulting in a worldwide degradation of environmental
standards (the `race to the bottom´ effect) and /or in a
delocalization of heavy polluting industries in countries with
lower standards (the `pollution havens´ effect). Moreover,
environmentalists and ecologically-oriented academics argue
that the political economy of decision-making is stacked up
against the environment. In the North, OECD interest groups
that support protectionist measures for other reasons continue
to invoke the race-to-the-bottom model, relying on the
perception that the regulatory gap automatically implies a race
to the bottom, even though some have argued that countries may
circumvent international agreements on tariffs by choosing
strategic levels of domestic regulation. Because avoidance of a
race to the bottom would call for the enforcement of uniform
environmental standards in all countries, which cannot be
created, they argue for trade restrictions until the regulatory
gap is closed. In the South, corruption is likely to result in
poor enforcement of the regulatory framework. Finally, at the
international level, environmental activists fear that the
dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO favors trade interests
over environmental protection.
To sum up, the arguments raised above, as well as empirical
evidence reviewed below, suggest that trade liberalization and
globalization (in the form of reduced transaction costs) could
lead to a global increase in environmental pollution as well as
to an increase in resource depletion as natural resource
exploiting industries, from forest logging companies to mining,3
relocate to places with less strict standards or use the threat
of relocation to prevent the imposition of stricter standards.
These effects are likely to be more important the further is
environmental policy from the optimum and the less well-defined
are property rights as is the case for the so-called ‘global
commons’. It is therefore not surprising that, even if trade
liberalization and globalization more generally can lead to
both an overall increase in welfare (especially if
environmental policy is not too far from the optimum) and to a
deterioration in environmental quality, a fundamental clash
will persist between free trade proponents and
environmentalists.
This paper addresses the relation between globalization and the
environment by re-examining evidence of a North-South
delocalization of heavily polluting industries.
1 Section 2
reviews the evidence on `pollution havens´
2, arguing that it is
either too detailed (firm-specific of emission-specific
evidence) or too fragmentary (case studies) to give a broad
appreciation of the extent of delocalization over the past
twenty years. The following sections then turn to new evidence
based on 3-digit ISIC production and trade data for 52
countries over the period 1981-98.
3 In section 3, we report on
the worldwide evolution of heavy polluters (the so-called
`dirty‘ industries) and on the evolution of North-South
revealed comparative advantage indexes. Section 4 then
estimates a panel gravity trade model to examine patterns of
trade in polluting products. Estimates reveal that transport
1 The causes of any detected relocation will not be identified because we
are dealing with fairly aggregate data.
2 In the public debate, the ‘pollution havens’ effect refers either to an
output reduction of polluting industries (and an increase in imports) in
developed countries or to the relocation of industries abroad via FDI in
response to a reduction in import protection or a regulatory gap.
3 The main data base has been elaborated by Nicita and Olarreaga (2001). An
appendix to the paper describes data manipulation and the representativity
of the sample in terms of global trade and production in polluting
activities.4
costs may have acted as a brake on North-South relocation, and
fail to detect a regulatory gap effect.
2. Pollution Havens or pollution Halos?
We review first the evidence on trade liberalization and
patterns of trade in polluting industries based on multi-
country studies that try to detect evidence of North-South
delocalization. We then summarize results from single-country,
often firm-level, studies that use more reliable environmental
variables and are also generally better able to control for
unobservable heterogeneity bias. We conclude with lessons from
case studies and political-economy considerations.
2.1 Evidence on production and trade in dirty products
Evidence from aggregate production and trade data is based on a
comparison between ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ industries, the
classification relying invariably on U.S. data, either on
expenditure abatement costs, or on emissions of pollutants.
4
Table 1 summarizes the results from these studies. Overall, the
studies, which for the most part use the same definition of
dirty industries as we do
5, usually find mild support for the
pollution havens hypothesis.
4 Most work on the US is based on pollution abatement capital expenditures
or on pollution abatement costs (See e.g. Levinson and Taylor (2002, table
1). It turns out that the alternative classification based on emissions
(see Hettige et al. 1995) produces a similar ranking for the cleanest and
dirtiest industries (5 of the top 6 pollution industries are the same in
both classifications).
5 As in this paper, polluting industries were classified on the basis of
the comprehensive index of emissions per unit of output described in
Hettige et al. (1995). That index includes conventional air, water and
heavy metals pollutants. As to the applicability of that index based on US
data to developing countries, Hettige et al. conclude (p. 2) that, even
though pollution intensity is likely to be higher, “the pattern of sectoral
rankings may be similar”.5
Insert table 1 here:
Multi-country papers on trade and environmental costs
The large number of countries and the industrial-level approach
gives breadth of scope to the studies described in table 1, but
at a cost. First changing patterns of production and trade
could be due to omitted variables and unobserved heterogeneity
that cannot be easily controlled for in large samples where
aggregated data say very little about industry choices which
would shed light on firms or production stages (Zarsky (1999,p
66)). For example, as pointed out by Mani and Wheeler in their
case study of Japan, changes in local factor costs (price of
energy, price of land) and changes in policies other than the
stringency of environmental regulations could account for
observed changes in trade patterns. Second, these studies give
no evidence on investment patterns, and how these might react
to changes in environmental regulation, which is at the heart
of the ‘pollution havens’ debate.
6 It is therefore not totally
surprising that the papers surveyed in Dean (1992) and Zarsky
(1999), by and large, fail to detect a significant correlation
between the location decision of multinationals and the
environmental standards of host countries. This suggests that,
after all, when one goes beyond aggregate industry data, the
“pollution havens” hypothesis may be a popular myth.
Recent studies respond to the criticism that the evidence so
far does not address the research needs because of excessive
6 Smarzynska and Wei (2001) cite the following extract from "A Fair Trade
Bill of Rights" proposed by the Sierra Club: “in our global economy,
corporations move operations freely around the world, escaping tough
control laws, labor standards, and even the taxes that pay for social and
environmental needs”.6
aggregation. However, this recent evidence, summarized below,
is still very partial, and heavily focussed on the US.
2.2 Evidence on the location of dirty industries
Levinson and Taylor (2002) revisit the single-equation model of
Grossman-Krueger (1993) using panel data for US imports in a
two-equation model in which abatement costs are a function of
exogenous industry characteristics while imports are a function
of abatement costs. Contrary to previous estimates, they find
support for the pollution havens hypothesis: industries whose
abatement costs increased the most, saw the largest relative
increase in imports from Mexico, Canada, Latin American and the
rest-of-the-world.
7
Drawing on environmental costs across the US that are more
comparable than the rough indices that must be used in cross-
country work, Keller and Levinson (2001) analyze inward FDI
into the US over the period 1977-94. They find robust evidence
that relative (across States) abatement costs had moderate
deterrent effects on foreign investment.
Others have analyzed outward FDI to developing countries.
Eskeland and Harrison (2002), examine inward FDI in Mexico,
Morocco, Venezuela and Côte d’Ivoire at the four-digit level
using US abatement cost data controlling for country-specific
factors. They find weak evidence of some FDI being attracted to
sectors with high levels of air pollution, but no evidence of
FDI to avoid abatement costs. They also find that foreign firms
are more fuel-efficient in that they use less ‘dirty fuels’.
7 Ederington and Minier (2001) also revisit the Grossman-Krueger study,
assuming that pollution regulation is also endogenous, but determined by
political-economy motives. They also find support for the pollution-havens7
This evidence supports the ‘pollution halo’ hypothesis:
superior technology and management, coupled with demands by
“green” consumers in the OECD, lift industry standards
overall.
8
Smarzynska and Wei (2001), estimate a probit of FDI of 534
multinationals in 24 transition economies during the period
1989-94 as a function of host country characteristics. These
include a transformed (to avoid outlier dominance) US-based
index of dirtiness of the firm at the 4-digit level, an index
of the laxity of host country’s environmental standards
captured by a corruption index, and several measures of
environmental standards (participation in international
treaties, quality of air and water standards, observed
reductions in various pollutants). In spite of this careful
attempt at unveiling a ‘pollution haven’ effect, they conclude
that host-country environmental standards (after controlling
for other country characteristics including corruption) had
very little impact on FDI inflows.
2.3 Case studies and political-economy considerations
Reviewing recently available data, Wheeler (2000) shows that
suspended particulate matter release (the most dangerous form
of air pollution) has been declining rapidly in Brazil, China,
Mexico, fast growing countries in the era of globalization and
big recipients of FDI. Organic water pollution is also found to
fall drastically as income per capita rises (poorest countries
have approximately tenfold differential pollution intensity).
9
hypothesis, this time because inefficient industries seek protection via
environmental legislation.
8 The mixed evidence on the pollution halo hypothesis is reviewed in Zarsky
(1999).
9 These results accord with independent estimates of environmental
performance constructed by Dasgupta et al. (1996) from a responses to a8
In addition to the standard explanations (pollution control is
not a critical cost factor for firms, large multinationals
adhere to OECD standards), he also points out that case studies
show that low-income communities often penalize dangerous
polluters even when formal regulation is absent or weak.
Wheeler concludes that the “bottom” rises with economic growth.
This result is reinforced by recent evidence based on a
political-economy approach that endogenizes corruption in the
decision-making process. Assuming that governments’ accept
bribes in formulation of their regulatory policies, Damia et al
(2000) find support in panel data for 30 countries over the
period 1982-92 that the level of environmental stringency is
negatively correlated with an index of corruption and
positively with an index of trade openness. Given that
corruption is typically higher in low-income countries, this
corroborates the earlier finding mentioned above, that
environmental stringency increases rapidly with income.
3. Shifting patterns of production and comparative advantage
in polluting industries
Direct approaches to the measurement of pollution emission
(e.g. Grossman and Krueger (1995), Dean (2000), Antweiler,
Copeland and Taylor (2001) and several of the studies mentioned
above) use emission estimates at geographical sites of
pollutant particles (sulfur dioxide is a favorite) or the
release of pollutants in several media (air, water, etc…). That
approach has several advantages: emissions are directly
measured at each site, and it is not assumed that pollutant
intensity is the same across countries. On the other hand
detailed questionnaire administered to 145 countries (they find a
correlation of about 0.8 between their measure of environment performance9
activity (e.g. production levels) is not measured directly.
Arguably, this is a shortcoming if one is interested in the
pollution haven hypothesis. Indeed, emissions could be high for
other reasons than the relocation of firms to countries with
low standards (China’s use of coal as an energy source is
largely independent of the existence of pollution havens).
The alternative chosen here is to use an approach in which
emission intensity is not measured directly. We adopt the
approach in the studies summarized in table 1 where dirty
industries are classified according to an index of emission
intensity in the air, water and heavy metals in the US
described in footnote 4. We selected the same five most
polluting industries in the US in (1987) selected by Mani and
Wheeler (1999) (three-digit ISIC code in parenthesis): Iron and
Steel (371); Non-ferrous metals (372); Industrial chemicals
(351); Non-metallic mineral products (369); pulp and paper
(341).
10 According to Mani and Wheeler (1998), compared to the
five cleanest U.S. manufacturing activities (textiles (ISIC
321), Non-electric machinery (382), Electric machinery (383),
transport equipment (384), instruments (385), the dirtiest have
the following characteristics: 40% less labor-intensive;
capital-output ratio twice as high; and an energy-intensity
ratio three times as high.
3.1 Shifting patterns of production
We start with examination of the broad data for our sample of
52 countries over the period 1981-98. The sample (years and
countries) is the largest for which we could obtain production
data matching trade data at the 3-digit ISIC level. Compared to
or environment policy and income per capita).10
the earlier studies mentioned in table 1, this sample has
production data for a larger group of countries, though at a
cost because comprehensive data--only available since 1981--
implies that we are missing some of the early years of
environmental regulation in OECD countries in the seventies.
Because there is a close correlation between the stringency of
environmental regulation and income per capita, we start with
histograms of indices of pollution intensity ranked by income
per capita quintile (the data are three-year averages at the
beginning and end of period). Given our sample size, each
quintile has 10 or 11 observations.
Insert Figure 1 here:
Histograms of production and consumption shares of polluting
products
Figure 1 reveals a slight change in the middle of the
distribution of production and consumption of dirty industries
as the second richest quintile sees a reduction in production
and consumption shares in favor of the top and lowest
quintiles. Turning to export and import shares (figure 2), one
notices a reduction in both trade shares of the highest
quintile in favor of the remaining quintiles.
These aggregate figures mask compositional shifts apparent from
inspection of the histograms at the industry level (see figure
A3.1 in the Appendix). For the second richest quintile, the
output share is always decreasing, but changes in the export
share vary a lot across sectors. For the richest quintile, the
10 Mani and Wheeler (1999, table 1) describes the intensity of pollutants
emission in water, air and heavy metals.11
output share is decreasing except for paper and products (ISIC
341) and other non-metallic mineral products (369), while the
export share is always decreasing, except for non-ferrous
metals (372).
Insert Figure 2 here:
Histograms of export and import shares of polluting products
In sum, these broad figures suggest some delocalization of
pollution industries to poorer economies. However, aggregate
effects are weak, partly because of opposite patterns at the
sector level.
3.2 Shifting patterns of revealed comparative advantage
We look next for further evidence of changes in trade patterns
in dirty industries. We report on revealed comparative
advantage (RCA) indices computed at the beginning or at the end
of the sample period. RCA indices are not measures of
comparative advantage since they also incorporate the effects
of changes in the policy environment (trade policy, regulatory
environment, etc).



















wa S ) is country i’s share in world exports of
polluting products (of all products) and ip
ia S ( wp
wa S ) is the share12
of polluting products in total exports of country i (of the
world).
Countries are split into two income groups (see table A1 in the
Appendix) that replicate the distinction between the three
poorest and two richest quintiles of the previous section: 22
high income countries (1991 GNP per capita larger than 7910 USD
according to the World Bank) and 30 low and middle-income
countries. Hereafter the former group is designed by developed
countries (DCs) or "North", the latter by less developed
countries (LDCs) or "South".
A first glimpse at the aggregate figures (see table 2) confirms
that LDCs’ share in world trade of polluting products is on the
rise. But the average annual rate of growth is lower for
polluting products than for exports in general. As a result,
LDCs as a whole exhibit a decreasing RCA (and an increasing
revealed comparative disadvantage) in polluting products (see
last columns of table 2).
Insert table 2 here:
Share of developing countries in world trade
However, inspection at the industry level (see table A2.1,
reveals that this reverse-delocalization outcome is due to the
dominating effect of non-ferrous metals (ISIC 372). All other
four industries present some ingredient of delocalization, with
a particularly strong increase in RCA for industrial chemicals
(351). Interestingly, non-ferrous metals represented more than
40% of LDCs exports at the beginning and less than 25% at the
end of the period, while the pattern is exactly opposite for
industrial chemicals.13
To unveil cross-country variations, figure 3 ranks countries by
decreasing order of RCAs for both income groups. In each case,
the dashed line represents the end-of-period pattern with
countries ranked by decreasing order of comparative advantage
so that all observations above (below) unity correspond to
countries withaar evealed comparative advantage
(disadvantage). A shift to the right (left) implies increasing
(decreasing) revealed comparative advantage, and a flattening
of the curve, a less pronounced pattern of specialization.
Figure 3:
Revealed comparative advantage indices in polluting products
Overall, LDCs’ pattern of RCAs is characterized by higher upper
values of RCAs and a steeper curve than high-income countries.
Over time, both curves appear to shift right
11 and become
somewhat flatter. The increase in RCAs seems larger in LDCs,
where it is concentrated in the middle of the distribution,
while it basically affects the end of the distribution in the
other income group. At the industry level (see figure A3.2)
results for LDCs are quite similar, expect for non-ferrous
metals, where the RCA curve shifts in
12.
Still, the above pattern does not say anything about the
changing pattern of RCAs between the North and the South, which
is what the delocalization hypothesis is about. To measure this
11 This result may seem puzzling but the contradiction is only apparent: the
weighted sum of RCAs is indeed equal to 1.0, but the weights can vary.
Thus, a simultaneous increase in all RCA indices may well happen, provided
a larger weight is put on smaller values.
12 Note that the pattern illustrated by figure 3 only reflects a
"structural" effect, i.e. the change of individual RCAs. The evolution of
the aggregate RCA for LDCs as a group is also governed by a "composition"
effect, namely the impact of changes in countries' shares keeping RCA
indices constant. Straightforward calculations reveal that for LDCs the
composition effect (-0.19) has been stronger than the structural effect
(0.13), leading to a net decrease of the aggregate RCA reported in table 2
(for results at the industry level, see table A2.2).14
effect, we introduce a new decomposition that isolates the
impact of geography on the RCA index. From (1), note that the
RCA of country i in product p ( p
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where the bilateral RCA (
p
ij RCA ) is defined as the ratio between
the share of product p in all exports of country i to country j
(
ijp
ija S ) and the share of product p in total world exports ( wp
wa S ).
This share is weighted by the share of country j in total
exports country i to the world (
ija
iwa S ).
Now let the world be divided in two groups of countries: nS in
the South, nN in the North (nS+nN=N). Then (2) can be rewritten:
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where p
i S is the South's contribution and p
i N the North's
contribution to p
i RCA . Thus, in terms of variation between the







i N S RCA ∆ + ∆ = ∆ (4)
Results from applying this decomposition to the two groups of
countries are reported in table 3. For each polluting sector,
we report the (unweighted) average of both sides of equation15
(4) over the LDCs’ group. It appears that in all cases but one,
the North's contribution to the change in LDCs’ RCA is
positive. This result is consistent with the pollution haven
effect. Again, the only exception is non-ferrous metal, where
North-South trade has negatively contributed to the RCA of the
South.
Insert table 3 here:
Table 3: North-South bilateral RCAs for polluting products
In sum, the RCA-based evidence on delocalization of polluting
activities towards the South is rather mixed. As a group,
developing countries exhibit a surprising reverse-
delocalization pattern of increasing revealed comparative
disadvantage in polluting products. However, as shown above,
this reflects both the pattern of one particular industry (non-
ferrous metals) and a composition effect: within the group of
developing countries, those less prone to export polluting
products have gained ground. In fact, most developing countries
have in fact experienced an increase in their RCA in polluting
products. Moreover, after controlling for geography, it turns
out that for all but for one case (non-ferrous metals), North-
South trade has had a positive impact on LDCs' comparative
advantage in these products.
4. Bilateral trade patterns in polluting products
Dirty industries are typically weight-reducing industries. They
are also intermediate-goods producing industries. As a result
if they move to the South, then transport costs must be
incurred if the final (consumer goods) products are still
produced in the North, as would be the case, for example in the16
newspaper printing industry. Hence the reduction in transport
costs and protection that has occurred with globalization may
not have had much effect on the location of these industries.
Our third piece of evidence consists of checking if, indeed,
polluting industries are not likely to relocate so easily
because of relatively high transport costs. To check whether
this may be the case, we estimate a standard bilateral trade
gravity model for polluting products, and compare the
coefficients with those obtained for non-polluting
manufactures.
Take the simplest justification for the gravity model: trade is
balanced (in this case at the industry level which some would
find unrealistic), and each country consumes its output, and
that of other countries according to its share, si, in world
GNP, Y
W. Then (see Rauch, 1999), bilateral trade between i and
j will be given by: Mij=( 2 Y iYj)/Y
W = f(Wij). The standard
“generalized” gravity equation (which can be obtained from a
variety of theories) can be written as: Mij=f ( W ij)(θ ij)
-σ where
θ ij is an index of barriers-to-trade between i and j, Wij is a
vector of other intervening variables that includes the
bilateral exchange rate, eij, and prices, and σ is an estimate
of the ease of substitution across suppliers.
In the standard estimation of the gravity model, θ ij is
captured either by distance between partners, or if one is
careful, by relative distance to an average distance among
partners in the sample, DIST, i.e. by, DTij=DISTij/DIST. Dummy
variables that control for characteristics that are specific to
bilateral trade between i and j (e.g. a common border, BORij,
landlockedness in either country, LLi (LLj)) are also17
introduced to capture the effects of barriers to trade.
13 Here,
we go beyond the standard formulation by also including an
index of the quality of infrastructure in each country in
period t, INFit (INFjt), higher values of the index
corresponding to better quality of infrastructure.
14 Finally,
because we estimate the model in panel, we include the
bilateral exchange rate, RERijt, defined so that an increase in
its value implies a real depreciation of i’s currency.
The above considerations lead us to estimate in panel the
following model (expected signs in parenthesis):
lnMijt = α 0 + α t + α ij + α 1lnYit + α 2lnYjt + α 3lnINFit +
α 4lnINFjt + α 5lnRERijt + α 6BORij + α 7LLi + α 8LLj + (5)
[α 9lnDYijt]+β 1lnDTij + η ijt
(α 1>0, α 2>0, α 3>0, α 4>0, α 5<0 α 6>0, α 7<0, α 8<0, β 1<0)
In (5), α 0 is an effect common to all years and pairs of
countries (constant term), α t an effect specific to year t but
common to all countries (e.g. changes in the price of oil), α ij
an effect specific to each pair of countries but common to all
years and η ijt is the error term.
In a second specification we introduce the difference in GNP
per capita DYij = [(Yi/Ni)-(Yj/Nj)] in the equation, this
additional variable presumably capturing the effects of the
13 Brun et al. (2002) argue that the standard barriers-to-trade function is
mispecified and propose a more general formulation that captures both
variables that include country-specific characteristics, and variables that
capture time-dependent costs (e.g. the price of oil). Since here we are
only interested in country-specific characteristics, time-dependent shocks
are captured by time dummies.
14 The index is itself a weighted sum of four indices computed each year:
road density, paved roads, railway and the number of telephone lines per
capita.18
regulatory gap across countries. If the regulatory gap effect
is important, one would expect a positive sign for α 9.
15
For estimation purposes, equation (5) can be rewritten as:
lnMijt=X ijtϕ +Z ijδ+u ijt with uijt = µ ij + ν ijt (6)
where X (Z) represents the vector of variables that vary over
time (are time-invariant) and a random error-component is used
because the within-transformation in a fixed-effects model
removes the variables that are cross-sectional time invariant.
To deal with the possibility of correlation between the
explanatory variables and the specific effects, we use the
instrument variable estimator proposed by Hausman and Taylor
(1981). However, we also report fixed-effects estimates which
correspond to the correct specification under the maintained
hypothesis (columns 1 & 2 of table 4).
Because the null hypothesis of correlation between explanatory
variables and the error term cannot be rejected, we re-
estimated the random-effects model treating the GDP variables
as endogenous. The results are reported in columns 3-6 of table
4. Coefficient estimates are robust and, after instrumentation,
the coefficient estimates are quite close in value to those
obtained under the fixed-effects estimates.
Insert table 4 here:
Gravity model: panel estimates
First note that all coefficients have the expected signs and,
as usual in gravity models with large samples, are robust to
15 In a full-fledged model with endogenous determination of environmental
policy, Antweiler et al. (2001) obtain a reduced form in which the
technique effect (change in environmental policy) is captured by changes in
income per capita.19
changes in specification.
16 Notably, the dummy variables for
infrastructure have the expected signs and are highly
significant. So is the real exchange rate variable which
captures, at least partly, some of the effects of trade
liberalization that would not have already been captured in the
time dummy variables (not reported here). Income variables are
also, as expected, highly significant. Overall then, except for
the landlocked variables, which are at times insignificant, all
coefficient estimates have expected signs and plausible values.
Compare now the results between the panel estimates for all
manufactures --except polluting products—(column 5) with those
for the five polluting industries (column 6). Note first that
the estimated coefficient for distance is a third higher for
the group of polluting industries compared to the rest of
manufacturing.
17 Second, note that the proxy for the regulatory
gap captured by the log difference of per capita GNPs is
negative for non-polluting manufactures (as one would expect
from the trade theory literature under imperfect competition
where trade flows are an increasing function of the similarity
in income per capita) while it is insignificant (though
positive) for polluting industries. Now, if indeed the
regulatory gap can be approximated by differences in per capita
GDPs across partners, the presence of pollution havens would be
reflected in a significant positive coefficient for this
variable.
Compositional effects for the coefficients of interest are
shown in table 5. Non-ferrous metals (and to a lesser extent
iron & steel) stand out with low elasticity estimates for
16We also experimented with other variants (not reported here) by including
population variables and obtained virtually identical estimates for the
included variables.20
distance. If one were to take seriously cross-sector
differences in magnitude, one would argue that the South-North
‘reverse’ (in the sense of the pollution havens hypothesis)
delocalization of non-ferrous metals according to comparative
advantage in response to the reduction in protection would have
occurred because of fewer natural barriers to trade. Of course,
there are other factors as well to explain the developments in
these sectors, including the heavy protection of these
industries in the North.
Insert table 5 here:
Panel estimates by industry
The sectoral pattern of estimates for α 9 indicates that the
regulatory gap would have had an effect on bilateral trade
patterns for two sectors: non-metallic minerals and iron &
steel, and marginally for the pulp & paper industry. Again, the
non-ferrous metals stands out, suggesting no effect of
differences in the regulatory environment, once other
intervening factors are controlled for.
In sum, the pattern of trade elasticities to transport costs
obtained here makes sense. Most heavy polluting sectors are
intermediate goods, so proximity to users should enter into
location decisions more heavily than customs goods that are
typically high-value, low-weight industries that can be shipped
by airfreight. Interestingly, after controlling for a number of
factors that influence the volume of bilateral trade, we find
little evidence of the presence of a regulatory gap, thus
broadly supporting (indirectly) the ‘pollution halo’
hypothesis.
17 One could note that the coefficient estimates on infrastructure are much
higher for these weight reducing activities which is also a plausible21
5. Conclusions
Concerns that polluting industries would ‘go South’ was first
raised in the late eighties at the time when labor intensive
activities like the garment industries were moving South in
response to falling barriers to trade worldwide. Such
delocalization could be characterized as a continuous search
for ‘low-wage havens’ by apparel manufacturers in an industry
that has remained labor-intensive. Fears about pollution havens
were already expressed at the time notably because of the
possible impact of the regulatory gap between OECD economies
where polluters paying more would lead them to search for
‘pollution havens’ analogous to ‘low-wage havens’. Later with
the globalization debate, the hypothesis gained new momentum by
those who have read into globalization a breakdown of national
borders, making it difficult to control location choices by
multinationals.
This paper started with a review of the now substantial
evidence surrounding this debate which can be classified in
three rather distinct families. First, aggregate comparisons of
output and trade trends based on a classification of pollution
industries based on US emissions revealed very marginal
delocalization to the South. Second, firm-level estimates of
FDI location choices by-and-large found at best marginal
evidence either of location choice in the US in response to
cross-State differences in environmental regulations, or of
location choices by multinational firms across developing
countries in response to differences in environmental
regulations. Reasons for this lack of response to the so-called
regulatory gap were found in the third piece of evidence
largely assembled from developing-country case studies. Taking
into account political economy determinants of multinational
result signifying another brake on North-South delocalization.22
behavior in host countries and the internal trade-offs between
leveling up emission standards (to avoid dealing with multiple
technologies) and cutting abatement expenditures, overall this
literature finds no evidence of havens, but rather of ‘halos’.
Turning to new evidence, this paper drew on a large sample of
countries accounting for the bulk of worldwide production and
trade in polluting products over the period 1980-98. Globally,
we found that revealed comparative advantage (RCA) in polluting
products by LDCs fell as one would expect if the environment is
indeed a normal good in consumption. At the same time, however,
the decomposition indicates that the period witnessed a trend
towards relocation of all (but one) polluting industries to the
South. The exception was the reverse delocalization detected
for non-ferrous metals. We argued that this reverse
delocalization was as one would expect according to a
comparative advantage driven response to trade liberalization
in a sector where barriers-to-trade turn out to be relatively
small. Finally, in the aggregate, RCA decompositions revealed
no evidence of trade flows being significantly driven by the
regulatory gap, again with the exception of some positive
evidence for the non-metallic and iron & steel sectors.
Estimates from a panel gravity model fitted to the same
industries showed that, in comparison with other industries,
polluting industries had higher barriers-to-trade in the form
of larger elasticities of bilateral trade with respect to
transport costs. These results confirm the intuition that most
heavy polluters are both weight-reducing industries and
intermediates for which proximity to users should enter
location decisions more heavily than for customs goods (i.e.
differentiated products) that are typically high-value
products. Finally after controlling for several factors that23
influence the volume of bilateral trade, we find little
evidence of the presence of a regulatory gap.
In sum, the paper provided some support for the ‘pollution
havens’ hypothesis, a result in line with several earlier
studies reviewed here. Beyond this result, the paper
contributed to the debate by identifying a new explanation for
the less-than-expected delocalization that had not been
identified, nor quantified, in the literature: relatively high
natural barriers-to-trade in the typical heavy polluting
industries.
In concluding, one should however keep in mind two important
caveats with respect to the ‘pollution havens’ debate. First,
like the rest of the literature reviewed in the paper, we only
examined manufactures. This implies that we did not take into
account resource-extracting industries that may have
successively sought pollution havens. Second, even within the
narrow confines of trade pattern quantification, a fuller
evaluation of the debate on trade, globalization and the
environment, would also have to examine the direct and indirect
energy content of trade.24
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Table 2: Developing countries world trade shares












(1) (2) (3) (4) (1)/(3) (2)/(4)
81-83 9.08 18.87 9.40 15.73 0.97 1.20
96-98 14.46 22.98 15.93 18.67 0.91 1.23
Average annual
growth rate
3.15 1.32 3.58 1.15
Table 3: North-South bilateral RCAs for polluting products
*
Sector ∆ RCA ∆ N
∆ S
Pulp & paper (341) 0.23 0.10
0.13
Ind. Chemicals (351) 0.41 0.21
0.20
Non-metallic minerals (369) 0.38 0.61 -
0.22
Iron & Steel (371) 0.66 0.39
0.27
Non-ferrous metals (372) -0.57 -0.79
0.22





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5 : Panel estimates by industry
Equation (9)
Industries
β 1 α 9
Non-polluting -0.82** -0.06**
All polluting -1.12** 0.007
Pulp and paper * -1.40** 0.08*
Industrial Chemicals -1.23** 0.03
Non-metallic minerals -1.21** 0.12**
Iron & Steel -1.12** 0.11**
Non-Ferrous Metals -0.95** -0.04
** and * significant at 99% and 95% respectively
* An estimate of –1.40 [-0.95] implies that if trade flows are
normalized to 1 for a distance of 1000km, a doubling of
distance to 2000 would reduce bilateral trade volume to 0.38
[0.52].30
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Figure 3: Revealed comparative advantage indices
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This appendix is in three parts. Section A1 describes the
data, transformations and sample representativity. Section A2
gives sectoral tables corresponding to the aggregate results
for all polluting products given in tables 2 and 4 in the
text. Section A3 does the same for figures 1 to 3 in the text.
A1. Data sources and sample representativity
The database is extracted from the Trade and Production
website of the World Bank (www.worldbank.org/research/trade)
and covers the period 1976-1999 for 67 countries. It includes
ISIC 3-digit data on imports, exports and mirror exports. For
the first five years and for the last year, of the open-sample
period, many countries reported missing values. Moreover,
mirror exports are only available since 1980 . Therefore, a
closed sample was defined over the years 1981-1998, with 52
countries (5 LINCs, 25 MINCs, 22 HINCs) reporting non-missing
values. for the 3digit trade data over this period. Categories
of polluting products in table A1.1, and closed-sample
countries
1 are listed in table A1.2.
Table A1.1: Categories of polluting products
ISIC code Description (rank
a in parenthesis)
341 Paper and products (6)
351 Industrial chemicals (3)
369 Other non-metallic mineral products (5)
371 Iron and steel (1)
372 Non-ferrous metals (2)
a Mani and Wheeler (1999, table 8.1). As in Mani and Wheeler, we
have excluded petroleum refineries (353) from the sample.
1 Income groups were defined on the basis of 1991 GNP per capita
figures. Following the World Bank cut-off levels, the sample was
split into three income groups: low (LINC, income lower than 635
USD), middle (MINC, between 635 and 7910 USD) and high income (HINC,
larger than 7910 USD) countries.2
Table A1.2: Countries of the closed sample (1981-1998)
Low-income Middle-income (ct'd) High-income (ct'd)
EGY Egypt MAR Morocco DNK Denmark
HND Honduras MEX Mexico ESP Spain
IDN Indonesia MYS Malaysia FIN Finland
IND India PER Peru FRA France
NPL Nepal PHL Philippines GBR United Kingdom
Middle-income POL Poland GER Germany
ARG Argentina PRT Portugal HKG Hong Kong
BOL Bolivia THA Thailand IRL Ireland
CHL Chile TTO Trinidad and T. ITA Italy
COL Colombia TUR Turkey JPN Japan
CRI Costa Rica URY Uruguay KWT Kuwait
ECU Ecuador VEN Venezuela NLD Netherlands
GRC Greece ZAF South Africa NOR Norway
GTM Guatemala High-income NZL New Zealand
HUN Hungary AUS Australia SGP Singapore
JOR Jordan AUT Austria SWE Sweden
KOR Korea (Rep.of) CAN Canada TWN Taiwan
MAC Macau CYP Cyprus USA United States
Sample representativity
a) open and closed sample
With respect to the open sample, and using the 1995-96 average
trade shares (the years with the maximum amount of non-missing
values), the closed sample represents about 95% of the open
sample trade.
Regarding the representativity of the open sample itself, this
was estimated using world trade data reported by the World
Bank (Economic Indicators 2001). Results are shown in Table
A1.3. These figures may appear quite low. However, it should
be kept in mind that world trade figures used in these
calculations are estimated themselves. As a result, even in
the original World Bank data, the sum of exports and imports
over 207 countries represent less than 100% of world totals
(see last two columns of table A1.3).3
Table A1.3: Representativity of the open and the closed sample
(%, using reported world totals by the World Bank)
open sample closed sample original source
a
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
1981 48.8 44.3 48.7 43.7 81.5 81.3
1990 58.9 59.5 57.3 57.9 86.4 86.2
1998 63.6 66.3 60.5 63.6 94.5 94.5
a) sum over the 207 countries reported in the World Bank data
base
Source: sample data and World Bank Economic Indicators, 2001.
b) income groups
Similar world totals were not available for income groups. In
this case, world totals were estimated by the sum of exports
or imports over all the countries available in the World Bank
source. To account for a maximum number of non-missing
reporters, these calculations, whose results appear in table
A1.4, are limited to year 1998
2.
Table A1.4: Representativity of the open and the closed sample
by income groups
(%, 1998, using calculated world totals
a)
open sample closed sample
Exports Imports Exports Imports
LINCs 64.6 61.4 52.1 46.8
MINCs 74.9 72.2 56.4 56.1
HINCs 92.8 92.9 92.8 92.9
All 88.3 87.5 84.1 83.7
a) sum over the 207 countries reported in the World Bank data
base
Source: sample data and World Bank Economic Indicators, 2001.
Generally speaking, representativity is larger for HINCs (and
of course for the open sample). However, even for LINCs and
MINCs in the closed sample, the coverage of world trade is
larger than 50% (except for LINCs imports).
2 Accordingly, it is a more recent classification of countries by income
groups (based on 1999 GNP figures) that is applied in this particular
table.4
c) polluting products
Similar calculations were not possible for polluting products,
as world trade data were not available at this level of
disaggregation. However, a very crude indicator of the
representativity of the sample for these products is simply
the ratio of imports over exports, which should be equal to
1.0 in case of complete coverage. These figures, along with
their standardized value obtained by dividing them by the
import/export ratio for all products in the sample, are
reported in table A1.5.






1981 0.96 0.92 1.04
1990 1.11 1.03 1.08
1998 1.14 1.03 1.10
Overall, the ratio is reasonably close to one, which suggests
an acceptable level of representativity for polluting
products.5
A2. Sectoral results: tables
Table A2.1: Shares of developing countries in world trade
Paper and products (ISIC=341)
polluting products all products revealed
comparative
exports imports exports imports advantage disad-
vantage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1)/(3) (2)/(4)
1981-83 3.70 12.70 9.40 15.73 0.39 0.81
1996-98 9.55 19.92 15.93 18.67 0.60 1.07
rate of growth 6.53 3.05 3.58 1.15
Industrial chemicals (ISIC=351)
polluting products all products revealed
comparative
exports imports exports imports advantage disad-
vantage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1)/(3) (2)/(4)
1981-83 5.11 21.55 9.40 15.73 0.54 1.37
1996-98 12.12 24.33 15.93 18.67 0.76 1.30
rate of growth 5.92 0.82 3.58 1.15
Other non-metallic mineral products (ISIC=369)
polluting products all products revealed
comparative
exports imports exports imports advantage disad-
vantage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1)/(3) (2)/(4)
1981-83 11.42 22.33 9.40 15.73 1.22 1.42
1996-98 16.28 19.16 15.93 18.67 1.02 1.03
rate of growth 2.39 -1.02 3.58 1.15
Iron and steel (ISIC=371)
polluting products all products revealed
comparative
exports imports exports imports advantage disad-
vantage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1)/(3) (2)/(4)
1981-83 9.09 23.63 9.40 15.73 0.97 1.50
1996-98 18.38 26.85 15.93 18.67 1.15 1.44
rate of growth 4.81 0.86 3.58 1.15
Non-ferrous metals (ISIC=372)
polluting products all products revealed
comparative
exports imports exports imports advantage disad-
vantage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1)/(3) (2)/(4)
1981-83 24.01 10.31 9.40 15.73 2.56 0.66
1996-98 22.91 17.88 15.93 18.67 1.44 0.96
rate of growth -0.31 3.73 3.58 1.156









341 0.206 -0.060 0.266
351 0.216 -0.087 0.303
369 -0.193 -0.301 0.108
371 0.186 -0.260 0.446
372 -1.118 -0.529 -0.589
Table A2.3 : Gravity equation: Hausman-Taylor estimates




c 369 371 372
ln (Yit) 1.50** 1.26** 1.27** 1.69** 1.82** 1.91**
(19.4) (12.6) (16.39) (15.4) (16.5) (17.8)
ln (Yjt) 0.92** 0.58 1.86** -0.58** -0.32* -0.16
(10.9) (5.0) (21.8) (5.0) (2.5) (1.3)
ln[(Yit/Nit)- 0.007 0.08* 0.03 0.12** 0.11** -0.04
(Yjt/Njt)] (0.3) (2.0) (1.1) (3.5) (2.7) (1.1)
Ln DISTij -1.12** -1.40** -1.23** -1.21** -1.12** -0.95**
(17.7) (14.4) (19.1) (12.9) (7.9) (6.8)
BORij 1.30** 1.68** 1.15** 1.70** 0.96** 0.87
(5.5) (4.01) (4.6) (4.2) (2.8) (1.6)
LLi 0.49 0.52 -0.28 1.76** 2.79** 2.26**
(1.66) (1.0) (0.9) (3.4) (4.23) (3.3)
LLj -0.42** -2.48** -1.99** -4.39** -3.79** -2.48**
(1.22) (3.8) (5.4) (6.9) (4.25) (3.3)
Ln INFit 0.46** 0.48** 0.43** 0.98** 0.51** 0.55**
(6.43) (5.1) (6.1) (9.3) (4.4) (4.9)
Ln INFjt 0.64** 1.19** 0.26** 2.22** 1.43** 0.15
(7.7) (9.9) (3.0) (18.6) (9.9) (1.2)
Ln RERijt -0.40* -0.57** -0.35** -0.66** -0.71** -0.19**
(14.3) (14.3) (12.6) (16.3) (16.6) (5.1)
Number of obs (NT) 30345 21831 28087 20907 21122 21591
Number of bilateral (N) 2300 2017 2240 1970 1938 1956
R² 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.44 0.51 0.35
Hausman test HT vs. GLS 614.7** 413.1** 589.6** 13.7** 97.9** 182.5**
chi-2(K) Chi-2(25) Chi-2(25) Chi-2(25) Chi-2(25) Chi-2(25) Chi-2(25)
** and *: significant at 99% and 95% respectively (t-student under
the correspondent coefficient)
Time dummy variables and constant term not reported .


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A3.2: Beginning(1) and End(2) of period RCAs, by country group
ISIC = 341
RCAs based on MEXP - LINC + MINC
rank
 rca1  rca2
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A3.2: Beginning(1) and End(2) of period RCAs, by country group
(cont'd)
ISIC = 351
RCAs based on MEXP - LINC + MINC
rank
 rca1  rca2
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A3.2: Beginning(1) and End(2) of period RCAs, by country group
(cont'd)
ISIC = 369
RCAs based on MEXP - LINC + MINC
rank
 rca1  rca2
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A3.2: Beginning(1) and End(2) of period RCAs, by country group
(cont'd)
ISIC = 371
RCAs based on MEXP - LINC + MINC
rank
 rca1  rca2
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A3.2: Beginning(1) and End(2) of period RCAs, by country group
(end)
ISIC = 372
RCAs based on MEXP - LINC + MINC
rank
 rca1  rca2
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